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・ On October 7, the "Japan-US Trade 
Agreement" was signed along with the 
"Japan-US Digital Trade Agreement". Both 
agreements are expected to be approved in 
Japan's extraordinary Diet session and enter 
into force on January 1, 2020. 
・ The Japan-US trade agreement, in line with the 
Japan-US joint statement issued in September 
last year, has achieved what both countries had 
respectively hoped for the most. On the other 
hand, the agreement is "partial" because both 
countries gave priority to an early agreement. 
・ The agreement is a “first-stage initial tariff 
agreement”. Japan and the United States have 
pledged to reduce or eliminate tariffs on only 
about $7.2 billion of each other’s goods. The 
second stage of negotiations is expected to be 
tough for Japan. 
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 On October 7, the “Japan-US Trade Agreement” was signed along 
with the “Japan-US Digital Trade Agreement”. The two agreements are expected 
to be approved in Japan’s extraordinary Diet session and take effect on January 
1, 2020. 
 In line with the Japan-US joint statement issued in September last 
year, the Japan-US trade agreement has achieved what both countries had 
respectively hoped for most. Japan was able to keep the liberalization of 
agricultural products under the agreement at or below the level of liberalization 
under the TPP. It was also confirmed that "both nations will refrain from taking 
measures against the spirit of these agreements and this Joint Statement”, with 
the limitation of “while faithfully implementing these agreements” included in the 
newly Japan-US joint statement. The Government of Japan views this as a 
commitment by the United States not to impose restrictions on imports of 
automobiles and auto parts from Japan under Article 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962. Contrary to this view, Ambassador Robert Lighthizer said, “at this 
point, it is certainly not our intention, the president's intention, to do anything on 
autos, on 232s, on Japan.” 
 With regard to beef and pork, the United States was able to get equal 
treatment to its competitors in the Japanese market, namely the member states 
of the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, or 
TPP 11) and the EU. In addition, the United States was able to maintain tariffs on 
autos and auto parts and only make commitments on “further negotiations with 
respect to the elimination of customs duties.” That is why Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe called the deal "win-win" for both Japan and the United States. 
 The Japan-US trade agreement was concluded less than six months 
after the start of negotiations. Even though the TPP was available as a basis for 
negotiations, this speed is unusual, and was probably achieved because the 
United States placed top priority on an early agreement. The entry into force of 
the CPTPP at the end of last year and the Japan-EU EPA on February 1 this 
year placed US exporters at a competitive disadvantage in the Japanese market. 
In particular, the MFN tariff rates on beef and pork are virtually applied to the 
United States only. For example, the tariff rate on beef is currently 38.5% for beef 
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from the United States but 26.6% for beef from parties to the CPTPP such as 
Australia and Canada. The United States was impatient to resolve this 
disadvantageous situation as soon as possible. 
It would also have been necessary to provide new export opportunities 
to US agricultural producers targeted by China’s retaliatory tariffs due to trade 
friction between the United States and China. With the friction with China 
prolonged, rapid progress was not made on congressional approval of the 
USMCA and, with little progress in trade negotiations with the EU, the United 
States apparently hurried up negotiations with Japan as “the lowest-hanging 
fruit”. 
The Trump administration took the unusual step of avoiding 
time-consuming congressional authorization by taking advantage of Article 103 
(a) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 
2015. In accordance with the Act, the United States promised to eliminate tariffs 
on only items with tariffs of 5% or less and halve tariffs on items with tariffs 
exceeding 5% under the agreement. 
Due to the importance of speed in the negotiations and the legal 
requirements of the United States, the agreement covers only a limited number 
of items. Japan pledged to reduce or eliminate tariffs on about $7.2 billion of 
agricultural products, and the United States on about $7.2 billion for 42 
agricultural products (about $43 million) and 199 industrial products (about $7.17 
billion). As Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said, “the deal strikes a balance 
between agricultural and industrial products”. 
According to the Government of Japan, the tariff elimination rates of the 
agreement are approximately 84% for Japan and 92% for the United States (on 
a trade value basis). The figure for the US includes the amounts for autos and 
auto parts. If these amounts are excluded, the US tariff elimination rate would 
likely fall below 60%. Article 24 of GATT calls for the elimination of tariffs on 
“substantially all trade” in regional trade agreements between developed 
countries, with a target tariff elimination rate of 90%. It is hard to say that the 
agreement satisfies this target at this point. If the US will not eliminate tariffs on 
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autos and auto parts in future negotiations, the agreement will be inconsistent 
with the WTO rule. 
The USTR calls the Japan-US trade agreement a “first-stage initial tariff 
agreement.” The second stage of negotiations is expected to begin as early as 
next spring. In the next stage of negotiations, the United States, which is seeking 
a comprehensive trade agreement, will present Japan with difficult issues, 
including exchange rate clauses, based on the “specific negotiating objectives” 
of trade negotiations with Japan compiled by the USTR in December last year. 
Now that Japan has given up its biggest cards, beef and pork, there are few 
cards left. The second stage of negotiations will be tough for Japan.  
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